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The research aims to find the impact of ownership retention, managerial ownership, and boards on value IPO 
premium and underpricing. We investigate by using hand collect data 202 IPO prospectuses during 2008-2017 
and using Warp PLS 5.0 to compute the data. Our finding suggests that may use to guide the investor in making 
informed decisions to see the level of the proportion of sharehold by old ownership and management. When the 
high level of ownership retention and managerial ownership, make the value IPO premium and underpricing will 
be high. On the other hand duality of the managerial role in firms making the value will be achieved. This paper 
contributes to the value of IPO premium and underpricing literature when influence by ownership share on initial 
public offerings  context of emerging markets. 

















Good Corporate Governance requires good management in an organization. According 
to Gul et al (2012) corporate governance mechanisms are mechanisms that protect the interests 
of shareholders. The corporate governance mechanism is a system that can provide protection 
and guarantees of rights to stakeholders, including shareholders, lenders, employees, 
executives, government, customers, and other stakeholders. According to Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) corporate governance is a way or mechanism to convince capital owners to obtain an 
appropriate return or return from their investment. Yermack (1996) states that there are two 
indicators of the first corporate governance mechanism of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms proxied by the number of directors, the proportion of independent commissioners, 
and debt to equity. Second, the size of external corporate governance mechanisms proxied by 
institutional ownership.  
In the perspective of agency theory, there is a conflict within the company due to the 
separation of ownership and control in the company. To reduce this conflict, it is indicated by 
the more concentrated ownership of a person or an institution, the stronger the control will be 
in the company. The relationship between ownership structure and firm value can be examined 
using the agency theory of (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). So that the greater the proportion of 
management ownership in the company, the management will try to improve its performance 
for the benefit of shareholders. 
According to Chahine and Tohmé (2009), managerial ownership shows the dual role of 
a manager, with the dual role, the manager does not want the company to experience financial 
difficulties or even bankruptcy. This is because the manager will get a different impact on his 
position. As a manager he could lose the other side of the incentive as a shareholder he would 
lose his return or even lose his investment. This is done by the manager because the manager 
is the shareholder of the company. By increasing the company's performance, the greater the 
results obtained by the manager from the investment invested in the company. Managerial 
ownership is a situation where the manager has a share of the company or in other words the 
manager and owner or shareholder of the company. 
In the statement, Yasser and Mamun (2015)  the ownership structure has 2 (two) 
implications, namely (1) the structure of ownership of the state, institutions, and individual 
shareholders. (2) ownership concentration which comprises the percentage of ownership. The 
high concentration of ownership by some people will make a lack of coordination costs, 
(Dharwadkar et al, 2000). This is due to the small number of new owners. The other side Bruton 
et al (2010) argues that the concentration of ownership retained by the company owner at the 
time of the IPO is an important factor that can reduce agency conflicts that have an impact on 
its performance. So that it will reduce agency problems between agents and principals. Thus 
increasing the number of members in a council will be more effective in terms of supervision 
and monitoring. So that companies with a large board composition will display good 
performance volatility with a low risk of bankruptcy (Nakano and Nguyen, 2012). So that the 
greater the number of boards of directors shows the increasing effectiveness of supervision and 
monitoring in protecting the shareholders who retain their shares from the risk of failure during 
the IPO. 
The Board is given the duties and responsibilities of supervising the management of the 
company and reporting everything related in the company to the board of commissioners. As 
a company organ, it is collegially responsible and responsible for managing the company. 
During the IPO process, the board of directors works and is responsible jointly to obtain good 
results, (Badru et al, 2017). In a previous study Darmadi and Gunawan (2013), emphasized the 
influence of the Board, managerial ownership, and old owner ownership on stock performance 
in cases in Indonesia. In other studies, Chahine and Goergen (2013) emphasized the role of the 
Maximus Leonardo Taolin and Julia Safitri : The Role Of Duality Managerial Ownership and Boards on IPO 





Board, managerial, and ownership of the value of premium IPOs. However, it does not identify 
the dual role of the manager as owner. 
As a reference reinforces the reasons for this research, the gap between the numbers the 
board of directors and underpricing is used as a reference. Things done to see furthermore the 
role of the board of directors, the other side is in the management company, but the other side 
of the directors are shareholders and long-time owners to companies that will conduct an initial 
public offering on the capital market Indonesia. In other studies, the composition of the board 
has a negative effect on underpricing, (Certo et al. 2001). Then by Darmadi and Gunawan 
(2013) found that there was a negative relationship between board structure and level 
underpricing at the time of the initial sale of shares. Dolvin's research and Kirby (2016b) said 
that board size is negatively related significantly with underpricing. The other side Lin and 
Chuang (2011), said the composition of the board has the potential to increase underpricing 
and share performance first sales. This is supported by Hearn (2011) that the composition of 
the board directors is positively related to the level of underpricing. On the other hand inside 
Orphan research (2011) found no significant influence on the board of directors towards 
underpricing. Upon this gap, concepts will be formed which is expected to be able to explain 
the business phenomenon that occurs in research. 
The gap from previous research can then lead the formation of a novelty that can bridge 
the research gap in research. Interestingly, there are differences in the number of directors in a 
company offering initial shares that have an underpricing value different, even though the 
company is engaged in a business line the same. The difference in underpricing is due to 
differences in information between market participants and owners or management within the 
company which made an initial public offering. 
Become a universal phenomenon that underpricing occurs at each Initial public 
offering, (Escobari and Serrano, 2016). For listed companies,  Underpricing will hurt them, 
because they fail to raise funds to the maximum, but profitable for investors (Rahim and 
Othman Yong 2010), because they get a profit (capital gain) from the price difference opening 
and closing. The underpricing phenomenon is a signal which gives a positive sign that the 
company is issuing initial shares has a probability of future profits. In Indonesia since the 
opening of the stock exchange, many companies have register (listing). The value of this 
underpricing is known through the trading first day on the trading floor. Ritter (1991), the 
difference in ratio between booking prices and closing is the initial return. As a universal 
phenomenon Underpricing is attractive to investors but this is detrimental to the issuer 
company during the first trading session. According to Maheshwari and Agrawal (2015) 
underpricing is a universal phenomenon that occurs in IPO whereas Overprice is a big concern 
when reducing investor prosperity. The issuer company listing in the capital market period 
2010 to 2017, there were companies experiencing underpricing, 14 overpricing, and normal 
prices during the bidding process in the market secondary. 
This phenomenon becomes interesting, because it is not only an underpricing event It 
can happen, but it can be overpriced in the offer of its shares. Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) say 
that the gap is informed investors and uninformed investors make share prices underpricing. 
As a result, Escobari and Serrano (2016), the group that did not get it good information will 
get overpriced shares in more portions large (uninformed investors). Whereas the group that 
receives information regarding the condition of the company, (informed investors) will buy 
shares in the primary market which are believed to be underpricing during the session 
secondary market closure. Here are 177 listed companies listing in the period 2010 to 2017, on 








Table.1 Listing companies on the IDX for the period 2010 to 2017 
Tahun Emiten 
IPO 
% Underpricing % Wajar % Overpricing 
2010 23 15 65% 1 4% 7 30% 
2011 26 9 35% 5 19% 12 46% 
2012 22 12 55% 4 18% 6 27% 
2013 30 13 43% 1 3% 16 53% 
2014 24 13 54% 1 4% 10 41% 
2015 16 6 37% 1 6% 9 56% 
2016 15 7 47% 1 6% 7 47% 
2017 21 6 29% 10 47% 5 24% 
Total  177 81 45,76% 24 13,56% 72 40,68% 
 
This study aims to see the effect of Ownership retention, Managerial Ownership, and 
Board on the value IPO premium of the company's. The difference with the previous research, 
that the sample in this study looked at the role of manager ownership as well as the owner of 
the company towards the IPO premium value and stock performance in the Indonesian capital 
market during the period 2008-2017. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Ownership Retention and IPO value 
When including a subsection you must use, for its heading, small letters, 12pt, left-
justified, bold, Times New Roman as here. In Fan (2007), study, it was found that when a 
company owner who decides to have a greater proportion of shares in his company will be a 
signal that the company is of good quality, this supports the opinion Leland and Pyle (1977) 
the old owners risk maintain a higher proportion of ownership but this will have a good 
influence in the future for the company. According to Kuntara Pukthuanthong-Le and Walker 
(2008), for investors, the proportion of shares was disclosed in the IPO company's prospectus, 
and the stock price determination by the underwriter was seen as a promising signal in the 
future. This is getting a good signal, where investors will be interested in investing to provide 
long-term benefits. 
Information regarding the large proportion of shares maintained by the company will 
be the main signal to assess the credibility of a company He et al (2015). According to Grinblatt 
and Hwang (1989) there are two main principles regarding the signal theory that must be known 
and observed before to the IPO and difficult to imitate by other companies that have lower IPO 
quality. Companies with lower IPO quality tend to try to sell as many IPO shares as possible 
to minimize the risk. Unlike companies with good IPO quality, it will try to maintain the 
proportion of its shares from the possibility of being controlled by other parties, (Yong Wang 
and Zhang 2015). The proportion of share ownership can be used as a tool to show or predict 
cash flows in the future. According to Leland and Pyle (1977) the proportion of share 
ownership can be used as a signal about the value of the company by the issuer. This is due to 
the assumption that the owner of the company will not release or diversify his portfolio if he is 
sure that his company has good prospects in the future (Wang and Iqbal, 2006). So that the old 
owner will maintain the level of ownership if believes the future cash flow is better than the 
current cash flow. Old shareholders and management will not release the proportion of 
ownership in the company if they are not sure of the success of the IPO, (Yong et al, 2015). So 
that the proportion of holdings held by old shareholders can be considered as factors that help 
build investor confidence in the success of the company's IPO.  
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Furthermore, Fan (2007) found that this then gave birth to the assumption that the 
higher the level of ownership by the old owner (ownership retained by issuers), the higher the 
market valuation of the company's value, which was reflected in the performance of the stock 
itself. Leland and Pyle (1977) said that ownership retention can bring good cash flow in the 
future, then the cash flow only occurs during the IPO. Whereas in the long run ownership 
retention is one of the signals and one of the parameters, which in the long run in the market 
has various factors (Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989). 
Keasey and McGuinness (1992) suggested that ownership retention by company 
owners at the time of the IPO had a positive impact on firm value. In the results of study Li et 
al (2005) said high retention rates attract more investor attention and provide quality assurance 
that increases the value of the IPO and its liquidity in the future. Where according to Cirillo, 
Romano, and Ardovino (2015) the IPO value reflects the potential value expected by investors 
from companies that conduct IPOs. Yasser and Mamun (2015), stated that the ownership 
structure has 2 (two) implications, namely (1) the structure of ownership of the state, 
institutions, and individual shareholders. (2) ownership concentration which comprises the 
percentage of ownership. Ownership of companies that conduct initial public offering (IPO), 
based on ownership by the old owner (ownership retention) which aims to expand the business. 
In the study Cirillo et al (2015), the percentage of family ownership as an old owner at the time 
of the IPO had a positive effect on the IPO Value. This happens because as owners of 
companies they come with a reputation for past success. Old owners always maintain the 
company's reputation in the eyes of investors that they have a responsibility to succeed in the 
IPO, (Mousa et al, 2014). The responsibility of the old owner is shown by the TMT (top 
management team) not only managing the IPO process but also directing the company's growth 
and negotiating the IPO price. With the retention rate by the old owner, it is assumed by 
investors that the owner wants the success of the IPO, so that the company's value becomes the 
quality reference, (Hull et al, 2013). With the ownership of a large owner will have a positive 
effect on the value of the IPO. 
Based on all the statements and theoretical reviews above, a temporary conclusion can 
be given through the hypothesis 
Hypothesis 1. Ownership retention during the IPO process has a positive effect on the value 
of the IPO. 
 
Ownership Retention and Underpricing 
There is also a liquidity theory which states that underpricing causes an increase in 
liquidity after the primary market (aftermarket) in the study of Li et al. (2005) there is direct 
evidence that the ownership of the old owner and underpricing has an influence that causes 
aftermarket share prices to increase. Li et al. (2005) found that the value of underpricing and 
ownership retention of companies is positively related and becomes an important variable in 
the decision of the initial public offering (IPO) as well (Leland and Pyle, 1977) argues that the 
proportion of share ownership held by the old owner (retained ownership) is wrong. one of the 
main factors in assessing IPO performance. Thus the proportion of shareholdings held by the 
old shareholders illustrates the level of management trust and the old shareholders will succeed 
in the IPO, (Fan, 2007), and (Leland and Pyle, 1977). Some of the reasons underlying this 
behavior are that when the old owners wanted good performance during the IPO, they retained 
a large number of shares, and when the initial bid managed to bring good performance, they 
also enjoyed the benefits, (Fan, 2007), Furthermore, after successfully raising funds for its 
investment plan, performance is no longer the concern of the old owners, where the price of 
shares on the secondary market has occurred according to market mechanisms, (He et al., 
2015).  The ownership by the old owner when the IPO becomes a good signal to investors 
about the quality of the issuer's company. The results of the research by (Leland and Pyle, 




1977) said that management behavior withholds shares when the IPO is a good signal of the 
quality of the company. The results of (Fan, 2007), the study found that ownership of shares 
by old owners had a positive effect on the level of underpricing and company performance in 
the primary market. 
In this context, it can be said that ownership by the old owner and management can 
increase the value of underpricing. Ahmed et al (2011) said ownership by previous owners had 
a positive effect on the performance of IPO companies. Jain dan Kini (1994) in Ahmed S. 
Alanazi et al (2011) found that IPOs in America performed well when the owners retained their 
majority shares. But there are differences in the results of Darmadi and Gunawan (2013) 
research, finding that there is a negative relationship between old ownership and underpricing 
of an IPO. Through the results of previous studies, there are differences in the results of the 
research. This is shown that retention ownership by the old owners in the company has a 
positive effect on underpricing, (Carey et al. 2016). 
Whereas (Boulton and Campbell, 2016) said that overhang shares or retain ownership 
of old owners have a positive effect on underpricing, this is then supported by, (Dolvin and 
Kirby, 2016). Likewise before, Handa and Singh (2015), the term promoter ownership was 
used as a variable that had a positive effect on the level of underpricing. According to Fan 
(2007) the old owner of the company (Ownership Retention) has a positive impact on the value 
of underpricing. The presence of high ownership retention will be a good signal for potential 
investors because they assume that the conflict between principals and agents occurs when the 
spread of ownership can be minimized (Darmadi and Gunawan, 2013). Based on all the 
statements and theoretical reviews above, a temporary conclusion can be given through the 
hypothesis 
Hypothesis 2. Ownership retention during the IPO process has a positive effect on 
Underpricing. 
 
Ownership Managerial and IPO value 
In the perspective of agency theory, there is a conflict within the company due to the 
separation of ownership and control in the company, (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). To reduce 
this conflict, it is indicated by the more concentrated ownership of a person or an institution, 
the stronger the control will be in the company. Likewise, the greater the proportion of 
management ownership in a company, the management will try to improve its performance for 
the benefit of shareholders, (Mohd-Rashid et al, 2016). Managerial ownership shows the dual 
role of a manager. 
With this dual role, managers do not want companies to experience financial difficulties 
or even bankruptcy. This is because the manager will get a different impact on his position. 
According to Chahine and Goergen (2013) ownership structure has a positive effect on IPO 
Value. Some previous research shows a positive relationship between ownership structure and 
firm value, where high managerial ownership will encourage the effectiveness of monitoring 
so that there is a convergence between the goals of managers and shareholders. Eugene F Fama 
and Jensen (1983) statement that the existence of large and concentrated ownership can control 
managerial performance. Chahine and Goergen (2013) Ownership structure have a positive 
effect on the value of the IPO. Whereas in the managerial context, ownership of family 
managers has a positive effect on the value of the IPO, (Cirillo et al. 2015). 
Ownership structure has a positive effect on the value of IPO, in the previous study, 
Leitterstrof dan Rau (2014),  Field dan Sheehan (2004) Jaskiwicz et al (2005), found that 
managerial ownership was positively related to the formation of firm value during the IPO. 
Increasing high managerial ownership can encourage exploitation by majority shareholders 
against minority shareholders, so that this will be responded to by the public in the form of a 
decrease in the company's IPO value. However, high managerial ownership can encourage 
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better monitoring activities so that the expected conflict between management and shareholders 
is reduced, which increases in the company's IPO value. 
As a manager he could lose the other side of the incentive as a shareholder he would 
lose his return or even lose his investment. This is done by the manager because the manager 
is the shareholder of the company. By increasing the company's performance, the greater the 
results obtained by the manager from the investment invested in the company. Managerial 
ownership is a situation where the manager has a share of the company or in other words the 
manager and owner or shareholder of the company. In high managerial ownership can 
encourage better monitoring activities so that the expected conflict between management and 
shareholders is reduced, which has an impact on increasing the value of the company. But on 
the other hand, an increase in high managerial ownership can encourage the exploitation of the 
majority shareholders of minority shareholdings, so that this will be responded to by the public 
in the form of a decrease in company value.   
Hypothesis 3. Managerial ownership during the IPO process has a positive effect on IPO 
Value. 
 
Ownership Managerial and Underpricing 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) the perspective of agency theory, there is a 
conflict within the company due to the separation of ownership and control in the company. 
To reduce this conflict, it is indicated by the more concentrated ownership of a person or an 
institution, the stronger the control will be in the company. Likewise, the greater the proportion 
of management ownership in a company, the management will try to improve its performance 
for the benefit of shareholders. The reason that high managerial ownership can encourage better 
monitoring activities so that the expected conflict between management and shareholders is 
reduced, which has an impact on increasing the value of the company. 
Managerial ownership shows the dual role of a manager, (Salloum Charbel, 2013). 
With this dual role, managers do not want companies to experience financial difficulties or 
even bankruptcy. This is because the manager will get a different impact on his position. As a 
manager he could lose the other side of the incentive as a shareholder he would lose his return 
or even lose his investment. This is done by the manager because the manager is the shareholder 
of the company, (Michel et al, 2014). By increasing the company's performance, the greater 
the results obtained by the manager from the investment invested in the company. Managerial 
ownership is a situation where the manager has a share of the company or in other words the 
manager and owner or shareholder of the company,(Djerbi and Anis, 2015). 
According to the study Jigao et al (2016), said that managerial ownership affects the 
performance of IPO companies. This is as stated by Yong Wang and Zhang (2015) that the 
proportion of share ownership by managers has a positive effect on underpricing. In the context 
of ownership of previous managers Howton, and Olson (2001) and Su (2004)  found that 
managerial ownership has a positive effect on underpricing, and Nikbakht et al (2007) which 
states that CEO ownership has a positive effect on the level of underpricing. 
Hypothesis 4. Managerial ownership at the time of the IPO process has a positive effect on 
underpricing 
 
Relationship of the Boards to the Value of the IPO and Underpricing 
In agency theory, the emergence of a conflict of interest is due to the separation of 
company ownership and control. This conflict comes from differences in perspectives and 
interests between shareholders (principals) and managers (agents),  (Eugene F Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). So that a good monitoring mechanism is needed to control and harmonize the 
interests of shareholders and managers, (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In the limited company 
law article 97, it is stated that the commissioner has to supervise the policies of the board of 




directors in running the company and advising the directors. The Board of Commissioners as 
a corporate organ is collectively responsible and responsible for supervising and advising the 
board of directors and ensuring that the company carries out good corporate governance. 
According to the National Commission on Governance Policy (KNKG, 2006) it is defined as 
a corporate organ that is collectively responsible and responsible for supervising and advising 
directors and ensuring that the company carries out Good corporate governance. The greater 
the number of commissioners will provide a lot of input and supervision to be done better. 
For the implementation of the duties of the board of commissioners to be effective, it 
is necessary to fulfill the following principles: 
1. The composition of the board of commissioners must enable decision making effectively, 
precisely and quickly, and can act independently 
2. Members of the board of commissioners must be professional, namely with integrity and 
ability so that they can carry out their functions properly including ensuring that the board 
of directors has taken into account the interests of all stakeholders. 
3. The supervisory and advisory functions of the board of commissioners include preventive 
actions, repairs, to temporary dismissals. 
In the Indonesian Corporate Governance Forum (FGCI, 2001), the characteristics of 
companies in the Indonesian capital market embrace two-tier board systems wherein the board 
structure is divided into duties and executive functions (board of directors) and supervisory 
functions (board of commissioners). The size and composition of the board of directors are 
following the company's strategy, during the IPO (Badru et al., 2017). Meanwhile, according 
to Darmadi and Gunawan (2013) the characteristics of corporate governance are seen from the 
board structure and ownership structure in the company. 
In the study of Bennedsen et al 2008) the greater the size and composition of the board 
of directors will have a positive impact on the performance and value of the company. 
Bennedsen et al (2008) noted the performance and value of the company will increase if the 
composition of the board of directors is dominated by people from outside the company, but 
on the contrary, it will decrease if the board of directors comes from the company itself. This 
opinion is supported by Xu (2012) that the IPO value has a positive correlation with the 
composition of the company's board of directors and the IPO value has a significant effect. 
Where managerial board involvement is instrumental in increasing the value of new companies 
(Mousa et al, 2014). Bennedsen et al (2008) stated that the size and composition of the board 
of directors will have a positive impact on the performance and value of the company whose 
composition is dominated by the board of directors from outside the company and vice versa 
the performance and value of the company become low when the size and composition of the 
board of directors come from within the company itself. There are differences in the results of 
Darmadi and Gunawan (2013) research finding that there is a negative relationship between 
the board structure and the level of underpricing at the time of the IPO, which is following the 
opinion Certo, Covin, Dalton, and Daily (2001) that the composition of the board has no 
relationship with stock performance in its initial sales. This contradiction by Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003) the number of small directors is more effective than a large number of 
directors because it reduces agency costs and members can play a more free role in the 
organization. However, if the number of councils is too large it will cause problems of 
coordination and communication and a high salary burden. The board of commissioners plays 
an important role in the implementation of the company's operational activities and reduces 
agency problems between managers and shareholders. Referring to the preliminary statement 
above, Yatim (2011), said that one of the signals of supervision and quality of good 
performance in a company is indicated by the mechanism of the board of directors and the 
board of commissioners protecting the ownership structure through the proportion of 
ownership. 
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This mechanism is carried out as the implementation of corporate governance within 
the company. In previous studies, it was found that the composition and number of board of 
directors had a negative effect on the value of underpricing, (Yermack, 1996) and (Eisenberg 
et al, 1998). Then reinforced by the results of Sasongko and Juliarto (2014) and Purwanto et al 
(2015), it turns out that the greater the number of commissioners will have a negative influence 
on underpricing. Likewise, Darmadi and Gunawan (2013) said that there was a negative 
relationship between the board structure and the level of underpricing during the IPO. 
Dalton et al (1999), said that one important factor in the implementation of effective 
corporate governance is the size of the board. Where the greater the number of commissioners 
in the company's board structure will increase effective supervision of the performance of the 
company's management. The large composition of the board of commissioners in the company 
is used as a signal for the quality of the company to the public, (Barroso-Castro et al, 2017). 
This can be shown by the increasing number of commissioners that show better corporate 
governance. The amount of the board of commissioners in a company will increase effective 
supervision of the company's performance Cirillo et al (2015),said that the involvement of 
managers can increase the IPO value of Issuer companies, this supports the opinion (Certo et 
al, 2003) that the existence of managers provides positive signal quality to investors about the 
quality of IPOs that affect the value of the IPO. Likewise, the more diverse the number of 
boards in an IPO company is the signal associated with the magnitude of the IPO Value 
(Zimmerman, 2008). Where the involvement of the board of directors at the time of 
determining the initial stock price has a positive effect on the value of the IPO company, 
(Mousa et al., 2014). 
Hypothesis 5. The number of Boards at the time of the IPO process has a negative effect on 
the Premium IPO Value. 
 
Hypothesis 6. The number of Boards at the time of the IPO process has a negative effect on 
underpricing 
   
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Sample and data collection 
In this study using a data panel that is a combination of time series data and cross-
section 202 companies that conduct initial public offerings on the Indonesia stock exchange 
for the period 2010 to 2017. All data is collected manually from the IPO prospectus, which 
contains the bid price, closing price, structure of managerial ownership, ownership retention, 
board, listed companies. Data comes from Bloomberg, Yahoo Finance, Indonesian Capital 
Market Directory (ICMD), and IDX statistics as well as through relevant secondary 
publications that are indirectly obtained through online media in the form of records of 
company events or company historical reports. which are arranged in the company's archives 
listed on the Indonesian stock exchange. 
 
Statistical and variable measurement 
Based on time-series data and cross-section 202 companies that made the initial 
offering, this research used WarpPLS5.0 software to estimate the research model described by 
3 (three expectoratory variables) and 2 control variables. 
Specifically, this is a research model. 





Figure 1. Summary of the Hypothesis 
 
𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝛽2(𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝)
+ 𝛽3(𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑) + 𝛿1(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒) 
𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝛽2(𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝)
+ 𝛽3(𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑) + 𝛿1(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒) 
 
Dependent variable 
Mousa, Marlin, and Ritchie (2013) use premium IPO as a proxy for measured of the 
IPO value. The premium IPO is used as a proxy with the reason that the IPO value is the 
offering price which is reduced by the book value and then divided by offering price. Where 
the book value is the initial book value of the share price announced through the prospectus. 
The formulation of the value of the IPO (Premium IPO) is also used by Certo et al. (2003), 
(Chahine & Goergen, 2013) (Mousa et al., 2013) dan (Cirillo et al., 2015).  
 
𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 =
𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
 
Whereas Darmadi and Gunawan (2013) calculated underpricing with the stock price 
formulation closing the first day of trading on the secondary market minus the sales price and 
then divided the sales price. Based on previous research on underpricing, for this research 
follows, (Darmadi & Gunawan, 2013) and (Samarakoon, 2010), with the formulation as below; 
𝑈𝑃 =





Referring to the previous research, Djerbi and Anis (2015) measured ownership 
retention as the proportion of shares held by an insider (management and director) after the 
IPO. While in the study Fan (2007), the measurement of the number of shares held (ownership 
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retention/alpha (α) is the total number of shares held by the old ownership before the offerings 
period, minus the number of shares in the offerings period then divided by the total number of 
shares after the offerings period as done, (Downes, and Heinkel, 1982; Feltham, et al., 
(1991),(Fan, 2007) Furthermore, it can be explained by the following formula (Li et al., 2005) 
and (Yong Wang & Zhang., 2015). 
  
total number of shares held by the old ownership (pre − IPO)
total number of shares (post − IPO)
 
 
Managerial ownership in this study was measured by the percentage of managerial 
ownership in IPO companies, (Deb, 2014) (Sasongko & Juliarto, 2014) and (Filatotchev & 
Bishop, 2002), (Elston & Yang, 2010) as well (Elston & Yang, 2010).In this case, the 
measurement of the board of this study follows Darmadi and Gunawan (2013) namely the 
Board size is the Natural Logarithm of the Board 
 
Control Variable 
Company size can be in the form of human resources, the total number of boards, and 
the total assets of the company. Through total assets, the company can give a signal that 
companies that have large assets will have good prospects. Total assets or also called assets are 
economic resources owned by the company and still provide benefits in the future. According 
to Leone, Rock, and Willenborg (2007), the size of the company (Ln Total assets) has a 
negative influence on the value of underpricing. Furtermore, Mnif. (2010), that the size of the 
company at the time of the IPO was negatively related to underpricing. In contrast, in the 
research, Ahmed S. Alanazi et al. (2011) found that the size of the company had a positive 
influence on the company's performance but was not significant. Then by Zhou and Lao (2012) 
using the firm size in Ln total assets has a positive effect on underpricing. Based on previous 
research on company size, this dissertation research follows, (Zhou & Lao, 2012), (Ahmed S. 
Alanazi et al., 2011) (Mnif. 2010), which uses Ln total assets for Company Size. 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 








Offering price on the first trading day on the 
primary market minus book value of share divided 
by Offering price 
Closing price on the first trading day on the 











The Proportion of common shares held by the 
managerial team 
Number of people serving on the board’s 
commissioners and Directors 
Logarithms natural Total asset of firms IPO 
 
 





Table 3. Description of Statistical 
Variable Number of 
observation 
Mean Max Min SD 
IPO Premium 202 0.43 0.89 0.57 0.34 
Underpricing 133 0.33 0.87 0.034 0.25 
Ownership retention 202 0.56 0.92 0.30 0.35 
Managerial 
Ownership 
201 0.66 0.96 0.23 0.31 
Board Size 202 8 28 4 3 
Based on the table above it can be seen that the Managerial Ownership Variable in the 
company during the period after listing in 2008-2017 on average was 0.96, which means 66%, 
the average for all companies in this study sample was Managerial Ownership. This will mean 
that management has a shareholding in the company for decision making. The standard 
deviation of 0.56 in the variable (OM) managerial ownership shows that there is an ownership 
bias of 56% or the presence of other dominant ownership in the company. A minimum value 
of 0.23 means that there is still a managerial party that has shares at the company. This is due 
to the characteristics of companies that are not public but state ownership. The maximum value 
is 96% indicating that there is managerial ownership in the company that makes the first listing 
on the capital market. 
In the variable OR (ownership retention) an average owner is holding for up to 0.56 or 
56% of the shareholding when the company is listing in the Indonesian capital market. It is 
also known that the standard deviation value is 0.1274, which means that 12.74% of shares 
occur in the bias that is not owned by the old owner of the average overall shares outstanding 
when the company makes a listing. The minimum value of shares held is 0.30 or 30% and a 
maximum of 0.92 or 92% which is the highest percentage of the old owner retains its shares 
when the company makes initial public offerings. 
Based on the table above it can also be seen that the boards in the company during the 
period after listing in 2008-2017 on average were 8 people in one company with a standard 
deviation of 3 on the variable boards. The minimum value of 4 which means some companies 
employ 4 people as a board. The maximum value is 28 indicating that there are companies that 
employ up to 28 board members in companies that do the initial listing on the capital market. 
Correlation Analysis 
Table 4. Correlation 











































P. value Notes: significance at :*10,**5, and ***1 Percent levels 
In table 4, it can be seen that the ownership retention variable is positively correlated 
with the variable IPO, Underpricing with a correlation coefficient of 0.227 ***, and 0.133 *** 
then Managerial Ownership (OM) is positively correlated with the Variable IPO Value, 
Underpricing with a correlation coefficient of 0.169 *** and 0.135 ***. The measurement of 
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variable Boards is positively correlated with the variables of IPO Value, and Underpricing with 
a correlation coefficient of 0.253 ** and 0.060 ** 
Result of Warp PLS 5.0 Analysis 
Table 5. The Goodness of Fit of  the Structural Model 
Criteria Parameter 
Average path coeffisient (APC) 0.266** 
Average R Squared (ARS) 0.287** 
Average adjusted R Squared (AARS) 0.252** 
Average block VIF (AVIF) 1.099 
Average Full Collinearity VIF (AFVIF) 1.175 
Tenenhaus GoF (GoF) 0.432 
Sympson’s paradox ratio (SPR) 0.889 
R squared contribution ratio (RSCR) 0.983 
Statistical suppression ratio (SSR) 0.836 
Notes: significance at :*10,**5, and ***1 percent levels of confident 
 
By looking at the test results of the goodness of fit model in the table above it can be 
explained that in this research model has a good and acceptable fit/fit where the P-Value APC, 
ARS <0.005. Whereas in testing the multicollinearity problem between exogenous variables, 
the AVIF value is 1,099 and the AFVIF value is 1,175 which 30 3.30 in this case, means that 
there is no multicollinearity among exogenous variables. Furthermore, for the predictive 
strength of the Tenenhaus GoF (GoF) model, it produces a value of 0.432 (≥ 0.36) which means 
that the predictive power of this model is very strong and acceptable. 
In measuring the causality problem in the research model with Sympson's paradox ratio 
(SPR), producing a value of 0.889 (≥ 0.7) is still acceptable because the ideal value is 1. Then 
to find out that the research model is free from the contribution of negative R squared can be 
seen from the R-value squared contribution ratio (RSCR) which yields a value of 0.983 where 
≥ 0.9 with the ideal value is 1. 
The next test is the problem of statistical suppression where a path coefficient has a 
large value when compared to the correlation path that connects two variables. Testing of 
statistical suppression impacts resulted in a Statistical suppression ratio (SSR) value of 0.836 
which was ≥ 0.7. in this case the model is free from the statistical suppression effect problem 
(Latan and Ghozali 2016). Seeing the results of the testing of goodness of fit this research 
model has good suitability. These results indicate that the results of the suitability evaluation 
of this model are in accordance with the support of available observation data. 
Table 6. A Result of Structural Model Evaluation 
Description path Path 
Coefficient 




































Notes: significant at :*10,**5, and ***1 percent levels of confident 





Based on the picture and table 6 shows the path coefficients and p values for each direct 
effect between variables that have a positive effect. The relationship between Ownership 
retention variables to Premium and Underpricing IPO values is 0.218 *** and 0.145 ***. This 
result supports  Leland and Pyle (1977) and (Darmadi & Gunawan, 2013) statement, that the 
ownership of the old owner gives an impression of the quality and prospects of the company 
in the future. Managerial Ownership (OM) of IPO Value and Underpricing (UP) shows 
coefficient value, 0.165 *** and 0.145 ***, These results confirm the research Chahine and 
Goergen (2013) and Mousa et al. (2014) that there is a dual managerial role as Owner will 
increase Underpricing. while the Board Number has a significant negative coefficient on IPO 
Value and Underpricing. This confirms the study, Darmadi and Gunawan (2013) that the 
number of boards in the company does not affect the performance of its shares. This is due to 
the addition of board members, by investors considered symbolic and not effective in decision 
making. 
To see the variations that affect the Premium IPO value can be seen in the adjusted R 
squared value of 0.167 which means that the influence of variations in Ownership retention 
(OR) managerial ownership (OM), and Boards, Company size (LSIZE) on premium IPO value 
is The remaining 16.7% 83.3% is explained by other variables not included in this research 
model. If you see the rule of thumb for structural model evaluation in this study it can be 
categorized as weak, where the adjusted R squared value is 0.167 less than (≤ 0.25 weak 
category). 
Adjusted R squared values for variations in the effect of retention Ownership (OR) 
Managerial Ownership (OM), boards, and Company size (LSIZE) on underpricing (UP) of 
0.261 or 26.1%, the remaining 73.9% are explained by other variables not included in the model 
this research. If you see the rule of thumb for structural model evaluation in this study it can 
be categorized as moderate, where the adjusted R squared value of 0.261 is greater than (> 0.25 
moderate category). 
As a reference for testing whether the Premium IPO Value variable has predictive 
relevance, it can be seen in the table above that the Q squared value is 0.196 (> 0), which means 
the model has predictive relevance which, if you see the rule of thumb, structural model 
evaluation resulting from premium IPO Value variables including in the moderate category 
where (Q2 ≥ 0.15). While the Q squared value generated underpricing variable (UP) is equal 
to (0.290> 0), which means the model has predictive relevance. If you look at the rule of thumb, 
the structural model evaluation resulting from underpricing (UP) variables is in the moderate 
category where (Q2 ≥ 0.15). 
The effect size value is required that the independent variable has a very weak, weak, 
moderate or strong influence on the practical point of view even though it has a significant p-
value. It can be seen that the effect size of Ownership retention on the Premium IPO Value of 
0.25 means having an effect size in the medium or moderate category from a practical point of 
view. It can be seen that for the effect size the Managerial Ownership (OM) of underpricing 
(UP) is 0.060 (<0.15), which means having an effect size in a small category or a practical 
point of view. Furthermore, the influence of board variables on Underpricing (UP) results in 
an effect size value of 0.167 (<0.15) indicating that there is no effect size. This means that the 
influence of the board on Underpricing (UP) is very weak from a practical point of view 
(practical point of view even though it has a significant p-value value. The effect size value 
influences the Company Size variable or total assets (LSIZE) against underpricing (UP) 0.130 
(<0.15) gives a variable meaning it has a weak or small effect size category from a practical 
point of view even though it has a significant p-value. 
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CONCLUSION   
This study utilizes ownership retention, managerial ownership, and Boards variables that affect 
the value of premium IPOs in listing companies in the Indonesian capital market. the more 
ownership retention increases will increase the value of the company along with the increase 
in stock prices at the close of the first trading day. The dual role of the management has the 
effect of increasing the level of Premium and Underpricing IPO values. Ownership retention 
makes investors place perceptions of the commitment and quality of IPO companies. This 
appreciation can be seen from the increase in the stock price from its expectations. 
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